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Abstract
Speech given at Session 4: The Legal Profession and Human Rights. Louise Arbour discusses the differences between the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the marriage between international law which
principally governs state relationships and criminal law which governs personal conduct, and how
this contributes to the development of international humanitarian law.

PROGRESS AND CHALLENGES IN
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE
Louise Arbour*
In the spring of 1993, in the context of the former Yugoslavia, and then, sadly, once again in the fall of 1994, in the context
of Rwanda, violations of human rights were recognized as constituting a threat to international peace, and the conduct was defined as criminal. This was enough of an achievement, I suppose, for those involved in human rights issues to think that the
work of a lifetime had been accomplished. I intend to call upon
you not to rest on that accomplishment, and instead invite you
to join me in making sure that this extremely bold experiment,
with its most noble recourse to the rule of law, reaches its full
potential.
Ever since I have been involved in the work of the Tribunals
- that is, since October 1, 1996 - I have been confronted on a
daily basis with the extraordinary difficulty of trying to marry together principles of international law (a profoundly consensual
body of law that is essentially concerned with regulating conduct
between States) with the criminal law, which is primarily concerned with personal liability. Viewed another way, the criminal
law governs the authoritative actions of States against individuals, and it is therefore a body of law that is profoundly coercive.
As I hope to be able to illustrate, this marriage is not always a
happy one, and legal practitioners, I think, can therefore make a
very important contribution to the development of international
humanitarian law.
I. THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
I wish to present a brief overview of the current state of affairs in the two Tribunals. You will recall that the Security Council created the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia ("ICTY") by a Security Council Resolution in the
spring of 1993.1 The ICTY is based in The Hague. It has ap* Prosecutor, International War Crimes Tribunal, The Hague.
1. See United Nations Security Council Resolution on Establishing an International
Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of Interna-

532

FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 21:531

proximately 350 employees coming from, I believe, about fiftyseven different countries.
The Office of the Prosecutor has a total staff of approximately 115, comprised of investigators, lawyers, data processors,
and other support staff. The Office of the Prosecutor is based in
The Hague, but we have small field offices, mostly for logistical
and liaison purposes, in Sarajevo, in Zagreb, and in Belgrade.
In all, seventy-four people have been indicted in the ICTY.
Eight are in custody. Two have been convicted, one pursuant to
a guilty plea, which is now the subject of an appeal, and the
other after a fully contested trial which lasted six months. That
trial resulted in the conviction of the accused on not all but, in
my view, the most important counts that were being prosecuted.
That conviction is also under appeal.
Another substantial trial is currently in progress, ajoint trial
involving the prosecution of four accused. This will be followed
by two more trials, at which point the current list of detainees
will have been exhausted. Therefore, I look forward to all initiatives that will be taken between now and then to ensure the continuity of the work of the ICTY.
The judges of the Tribunal are elected by the General Assembly, and they have a four-year term of office. There has recently been a new election for the judges of the Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia, whose term of office expires in November of
this year. Eleven judges, including some of the present judges,
have been chosen by the General Assembly for the next four
years.
II. THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR
RWANDA
In November 1994, after a genocide that saw (certainly by
conservative estimates it would seem) some half a million people
killed in approximately one hundred days, the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 2 ("ICTR") was created under a
tional Law Committed in the Territory of the former Yugoslavia, S.C. Res. 827, U.N.
SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993) (establishing international Tribunal to prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of international
humanitarian law).
2. Establishment of an International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the
Territory of Rwanda and Rwandese Citizens Responsible for such Violations Committed
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statute virtually identical to that of the ICTY. The seat of the
ICTR is in Arusha, Tanzania. It is, therefore, a completely distinct institution. It has its own statute, its own body of rules, and
its independent seat.
However, the two Tribunals share two institutions. They
have a common Prosecutor and a common Appeal Chamber. I
serve as Prosecutor in both Tribunals, and my Rwanda staff
members are primarily based in my office in Kigali, Rwanda.
The Appeal Chamber is comprised of the five judges of the ICTY
and is based in The Hague.
The Office of the Prosecutor for the ICTR in Kigali has a
staff of about one hundred. It has indicted twenty-one persons
so far, thirteen of whom are in custody in Arusha, and several
trials are presently in progress.
Each Tribunal is principally funded through the General
Assembly of the United Nations. The budget for each Tribunal
is currently a little under US$50 million. The budgets are supplemented by voluntary contributions that States make to a trust
fund.
The legal framework governing Tribunals is, by any measure, somewhat skeletal. Each statute, created by the Security
Council Resolution, contains thirty-four Articles, most of which
concern themselves with the constitutional framework of the Tribunal, and many tie terms and conditions of those serving in it,
particularly the judges.
Apart from these thirty-four Articles, the Tribunals have a
set of Rules of Procedure and Evidence enacted by the judges
sitting in plenary session. All in all, this entire body of provisions
contain some 125 Rules. The Tribunals, obviously being new
legal institutions, have virtually no jurisprudence to work from
and a very small body of doctrine, essentially the legal writings
that were generated following the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials.
The judges are elected by the General Assembly. There are
six trial judges for each Tribunal. The judges do not sit with
juries. A Trial Chambers comprises three judges sitting together. The maximum capacity of the Tribunal is to hold two
trials (one before each Chamber) at any one time. At this point
in their development, each Tribunal only has one courtroom.
in the Territory of Neighboring States, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453rd

mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994).
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An immediate distinction can be seen between the work of these
Tribunals and a domestic criminal justice system because a domestic prosecutor is never really seriously called upon to be selective in the prosecution of serious crimes. Crimes are committed, they are reported, investigated, charges are brought, and
the prosecutors prosecute all major crimes where the evidence
permits.
By contrast, in the work of the international Tribunals, the
Prosecutor has to be highly selective before committing resources to investigate or prosecute, and must work in a manner
that can complement domestic legal systems. That is what we
have had to do.
The Tribunals are extraordinary institutions in many ways. I
will highlight some of the fundamental issues that illustrate what
future there is for the enforcement of human rights as criminal
conduct. Criminal conduct becomes a threat to international
peace when domestic institutions are either unwilling or unable
to deliver justice in adequate response to the harm inflicted.
Both of these ad hoc Tribunals are premised on the principle of
complementarity (although with primacy) over domestic jurisdictions.
In both the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda, for very different reasons, the national criminal justice system was too incapacitated to satisfy the forms ofjustice in the context of the enormity of the injury inflicted on the social fabric of these countries
by the crimes committed. In Rwanda, the genocide left the
country with virtually no functioning justice system. Even as the
system is now recuperating and is beginning to function, that
system is unlikely to satisfy all extradition norms that would allow
it to seize suspects of important cases on its own where the suspects are outside the country. The Rwandese Government itself
took the initiative in proposing the establishment of an international Tribunal as early as September 1994, before any serious
consideration was given to the matter by other States.
During the Security Council deliberations, the Rwandese
representative invoked four basic arguments in support of establishing an ad hoc international criminal jurisdiction, and all these
basic arguments illustrate the suitability of using Chapter VII of

19971

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE

the United Nations Charter, 3 that is, a fundamentally coercive
measure to bring criminal law into play in the field of international affairs.
First, the Rwandese Government favored an international
Tribunal based on the view that the genocide committed in
Rwanda is a crime against humankind and should be suppressed
by the international community as a whole.
The second argument given by the Rwandese Government
for supporting an international Tribunal was its desire to avoid
any suspicion of its wanting to organize speedy, vengeful justice.
This was very much in line with criticisms historically mounted to
what could be perceived as repressive measures taken in a postconflict situation by whoever could emerge with the capacity to
use justice for political ends.
Third, the Rwandese Government believed that it is impossible to build a state of law and arrive at true national reconciliation without eradicating the culture of impunity which has characterized Rwandese society. I think it is fair to say that the culture of impunity referred to in that argument is not unique to
Rwandese society. There had been a widespread assumption
that national sovereignty would always trump international efforts to intervene, even in the face of the most horrendous violation of human rights.
The fourth argument made by the Rwandese Government
was that it wanted an international Tribunal in order to make it
easier to get at those criminals who have found refuge in foreign
countries. This was a highly important pragmatic consideration
because, as is often the case, in that particular instance, many of
the perpetrators, especially those in a position of leadership, had
fled Rwanda. Hence, the appropriateness of coercive international action.
Now, for the first time since Nuremberg and Tokyo, a serious attempt is being made at punishing, and therefore possibly
preventing, the perpetration of the most horrendously violent,
large scale criminal attacks on human life: genocide; widespread
or systematic persecutions on a racial, religious, or political
ground; murder; rape; torture; deportation; or enslavement of
civilian populations.
3. See U.N. CHARTER art. 39,
international peace).

1 (outlining power of Security Council to maintain
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How will this be done? I return to what I described as an
unhappy marriage between international law and criminal law.
The union will be achieved, I believe, to some extent by consensus, but unavoidably, in my opinion, it will have to be done in
large part by force. The Security Council made a decision that
there could be no lasting peace in the former Yugoslavia or in
Rwanda without national reconciliation, and further, that there
could be no such reconciliation without justice.
Personal criminal responsibility for war crimes and for genocide was thus used for the first time since Nuremberg and Tokyo. But there should be no misapprehension that this unfolding of a criminal process can be done on a consensual, voluntary basis. The Security Council passed a resolution binding
on all Member States which provides that the Prosecutor shall
act independently as a separate organ of the Tribunal.4 The
Prosecutor is given the dual responsibility for investigation and
prosecution. The Prosecutor may initiate investigations ex officio
or from information received, but the statute makes it absolutely
clear that the Prosecutor shall neither seek nor receive instructions from any government, nor from any other source. Under
the statute, the Prosecutor has the power to question suspects,
collect evidence, and conduct on-site investigations. In doing so,
she may, where appropriate, seek the assistance of the State authorities concerned. The statute provides that cooperation with
the Tribunal is compulsory. It specifically says, "States shall cooperate with the International Tribunal... States shall comply
without undue delay with any request for assistance or an order
issued by a Trial Chamber . . . ."' These include orders for the
arrest, detention, surrender, and transfer of persons to the seat
of the Tribunal. It is, therefore, clearly compulsory for all States
to comply with these obligations. Failure to do so is a violation
of international law and may be reported as such to the Security
Council, which may decide to take appropriate action.
Many countries have enacted specific legislation permitting
them to discharge these obligations, including the obligation to
supply evidence to the Tribunal and to arrest persons indicted
4. United Nations Secretary General's Report on Aspects of Establishing an International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia,
U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993).
5. Id.
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should any be found on their territory. Other countries have
formally notified the Tribunal of their ability to comply under
their existing national law without the need to enact further legislation.
Many countries have not taken those steps. They have
neither enacted legislation permitting them to comply, nor have
they notified the Tribunal that they can do so without legislative
intervention. My own country, Canada, is one of those yet to
notify the Tribunal of its capacity to comply or to enact legislation. I would certainly urge all lawyers to scrutinize the activities
of their own government to ensure that the widespread support
that was given to the creation of these institutions actually translates into the kind of action that is necessary to make these two
Tribunals functional.
Accused have been arrested all over the world in relation to
both Tribunals. There have been arrests in Germany, Switzerland, Cameroon, Kenya, Zambia, Belgium, and the United
States. If an accused was located in any country, I would make a
formal demand for his or her arrest and transfer to The Hague,
and I believe that law-abiding people everywhere would expect
compliance.
Some States, particularly the Republics of Croatia and Serbia and the Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, are not
complying or are not fully complying with their international obligation to cooperate with the Tribunal - specifically, their obligation to arrest and surrender indicted persons to The Hague.
On that issue, I have been fully engaged in discussions with
many foreign ministries, ministers of justice, representatives of
the European Union, and NGOs (non-governmental organizations), urging bilateral and multilateral diplomatic intervention,
and exploring all other options to remedy the situation. I am
confident that I can also call upon the support of all lawyers interested in, and committed to, the advancement of human rights
issues. Such legal support and intervention is most important if
the Tribunals are to fulfill their mandates. I particularly would
like to call on lawyers to use their skills to assist in developing the
means to guarantee the lasting success of the Tribunals.
Let me briefly address some of those legal issues. There is a
great gulf between the establishment of these two new criminal
jurisdictions on paper and the capacity of the international com-
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munity to render these Tribunals operational and effective. The
practical problems involved in setting up these kinds of institutions should not be overlooked, nor should the difficulties be
underestimated: the conclusion of host country agreements; the
location or construction of suitable physical premises such as
courtrooms and detention facilities; the formulation of rules of
procedure and evidence which reflect the diverse legal systems;
and particularly the two competing leading legal systems of the
world, the civil law system (or continental law system, as it is
sometimes referred to) and the common law-based legal tradition. These two systems are often clashing for, supremacy over
the development of this body of international criminal law. The
list continues: the recruitment of qualified investigators and
prosecutors who will be required to work, often for the first time
in their lives, through the assistance of interpreters; working in a
cultural environment that is unfamiliar to them; gathering witness testimony and evidence in several States where refugee
populations are located; functioning in a country that still suffers
from the aftermath of war, or where the basic infrastructure,
such as roads and telephones, has been impaired or destroyed;
not having access to documents which are vital to the preparation of their cases against suspects; having, on the other hand, to
translate mountains of information which may prove useless;
and having to rely entirely on State cooperation and on international political pressure to secure the apprehension of suspects.
These are all by-products of operating without any preexisting law enforcement infrastructure, and on this point it is instructive to recall some of the important differences between the
International Military Tribunal of Nuremberg and these two ad
hoc Tribunals. As the name indicates, the Nuremberg Tribunal
was a military tribunal. It was multinational rather than truly international. It was composed essentially of the four victorious
Allies as part of a political settlement. The war was over when
the International Military Tribunal was created. War was still
raging in the former Yugoslavia when the International Criminal
Tribunal was set up to examine and to start investigating violations of international humanitarian law. In Nuremberg, most of
the defendants were in custody when the work of the Tribunal
was launched. The International Military Tribunal had a staff of
two thousand, including one hundred prosecutors. It had four
chief prosecutors and four judges with four alternates.
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The International Military Tribunal had only some very basic rules of procedure and evidence. In fact, it only had eleven
written rules.6 It was entitled to hold trials in absentia, and in fact
it did; Martin Borman was tried in his absence. The Nuremberg
Tribunal could and did impose the death penalty, and there was
no right of appeal.
In contrast, the two ad hoc Tribunals reflect a huge evolution in criminal justice standards, including the heavy obligations of prosecutorial disclosure, obligations relating to exculpatory evidence (which are particularly onerous because of the difficulties of translation, computerization, and the sheer volume
of material in possession of the Office of the Prosecutor).
Over time, the International Military Tribunals of Nuremberg and Tokyo have gained a broad measure of acceptance.
That is a crucial factor, perhaps the most precious feature of domestic criminal justice we must generate and cultivate in an international context. The Tribunals must gain the trust and respect of the international community and of the legal community. We must never forget that coercive powers can only safely
be based on, and exercised by, judicial organs which enjoy widespread acceptability and credibility.
In functioning democracies, courts generally enjoy a large
measure of acceptability. Prosecutors and judges are generally
perceived as unbiased and fair, working with knowledge and integrity. They are generally perceived as such not only by the
general population but also by the immediate victims of crimes
and offenders alike. Acceptance is not universal, but it is sufficiently widely shared to permit the easy functioning of the courts
without recourse to massive physical coercion.
It is the general consensus underlying criminal justice that
permits it to be coercive against a relatively few recalcitrants. In
the international context, there is no preexisting solid basis of
credibility upon which the Tribunals can draw in order to develop appropriate coercive powers.
I believe that we must guard against becoming a generation
of armchair Schindlers. We must not allow ourselves to fall into
the trap of reassuring ourselves with some kind of romantic notion that, of course, we would always rise to the big challenges,
6. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of
the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279.
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while in reality remaining conveniently blind to the constant but
unglamourous day-to-day effort and commitment that it takes to
put ourselves on the right side of history. I have no doubt that
the proliferation of armed conflicts, mostly bitter internal ones
emerging from ethnic and regional intolerance and from competition for scarce and unevenly located resources, will tax the
world's capacity for conflict resolution in the years to come. I
believe that the International Tribunals illustrate that never
before have lawyers had so much to contribute with so much at
stake.

